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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
METROPOLITAN WATER 
l)ISTRICT OF PROVO CITY, 
a public corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 




BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 
10,000 
This is an action to determine as between re-
spondent (plaintiff) ·and appellant (defendant) 
which is entitled to the interest and income derived 
from the investment of $6,000.00 paid by respon-
dent to appellant on December 2, 1946 necessary 
and preparatory to the execution of an Amendatory· 
Stock Subscription Contract between respondent 
and appellant dated February 3, 1947 whereby the 
original contract under which respondent subscrib-
ed for stock in appellant corporation was amended 
to increase the maximum indebtedness of respon-
dent to appellant . 
. -\ppellant contends th~at the $6,000.00 was a 
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payment to appellant on the purchase price of the 
stock, thereby reducing by $6,000.00 respondent's 
then existing indebtedness to appellant as expressly 
recited in the Amendatory Subscription Contract, 
and thereupon the $6,000.00 became the absolute 
property of appellant and any interest earned on 
the investment thereof likewise belongs to appellant. 
Respondent contends that the $6,000.00 was de-
livered to appellant upon a mutual understanding 
that the proceeds would be held and invested by 
appellant until such time as payments to the United 
States would become due under appellant's contract 
with the United States and that the interest derived 
from such investment should accrue to the credit 
of the respondent. 
DISPOSITION BY TRIAL COURT 
'The trial court foun·d that the $6,000.00 was 
delivered to appellant upon 1a mutual understanding 
that the same would be invested and the interest 
derived therefrom would accrue to respondent, and 
held that the respondent was entitled to the income 
and interest derived from such investment, both 
past and future, an·d ordered appell!ant to 
(a) keep the $6,000.00 invested at the 
highest rate of interest consistent with safety; 
(b) pay the $6,000.00 over to the 
United States when the first payment shall 
become due to the United States from appel-
1ant under a supplemental contract between 
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appellant and the United States, and to give 
respondent credit therefor on its indebtedness 
to appellant; and 
(c) give respondent credit for all in-
terest and income derived from the invest-
ment of the $6,000.00 on any payment, wheth-
er classed as installments, assessments or 
otherwise, which may hereafter ·become due 
to appellant from respondent under their 
amendatory subscription contract. 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPELLANT 
By this ~appeal appellant seeks a reversal of the 
decision of the trial court by setting aside the Fin~d­
ings Of Fact, Conclusions 'Of Law and Judgment 
entered and directing the entry ·of new Findings Of 
Fact, Conclusions Of Law and Judgment adjudging 
(a) that the $6,000.00 was 'a payment 
by respondent to appellant on the purchase 
price of the stock an·d that the indebtedness 
of respondent to appellant under its stock sub-
scription contract with appellant W1as there-
by reduce(d by the sum of $6,000.00; 
(b) that the $6,000.00 became and is 
the property of appellant, and appellant is 
entitled to all interest and income derived 
from the investment thereof; :and 
(c) that the respondent ~has no claim 
or right to the interest or income derived 
from the investment of the $6,000.00. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-Respondent is a metropolitan water 
district organized and existin'g under the provisions 
of what is now Chapter 8, Title 7·3, Utah Code An .. 
notated 1'9'53. Defendant-Appellant is a corporation 
organized and existing under the laws of the State 
of Utah primarily for the purpose of contracting 
with the United States of America for the repay-
ment of ~he cost of construction of the Deer Creek 
Division of the Provo River Project and for the 
operation (and maintenance thereof. Respondent is 
one of the subscribers of stock of appellant corpor-
ation. 
To accomplish its purpose appellant entered 
into a series of written contracts with the United 
States of America, acting through its Bureau of 
Rec]amation. Under the terms of the original con-
tract dated June 27, 1936 (Pl. Exh. 2), as amended 
on July 3, 1937 (Pl. Exh. 3), the United States in 
substance agreed to expend up to $7,600,000.00 to-
wards the construction of the Project, which appel-
lant agreed to repay without interest in forty equal 
~annual installments (Fdg. 3- R. 119, 120; Pl Exh. 
2, par. '1'7). 
On September 18, 193'7 respondent and appel-
lant entered into a stock subscription contract where-
by respondent subscribed for eight thousand (8,000) 
shares of stock of appellant corporation and agreed 
to pay appellant therefor the full purchase price 
thereof, which was defined as that proportion of 
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the total sums and charges required to be paid by 
appellant to the United States that the eight thous-
and (8,000) shares bears to the total number of 
shares outstanding ( 100,000) ; provided, however, 
that the total purchase price shall not exceed the 
sum of ·$608,000.00 (eight percent of $7,600,000.00) 
(Fdg. 4 - R. '1'20; Pl. Ex·h. 4, par. 8, 9, 15). In 
addition ·thereto respon'dent agreed to pay appe'll,ant 
a proportionate share of the default of the other 
stockholders; provided, however, that respondent's 
proportionate s·hare thereof would not exceed 
$212,800.00 (Pl. Exh. 4, par. 15). 'The payments 
were to be made by respondent when assessed by 
appellant in order that appellant could make its 
payments to the United States (1Pl. Exh. 4, par. 8). 
Respondent fur~her agreed to pay 1appellant the 
assessments levie'd for respondent's share of the gen-
eral corporate expenses and expenses of the operation 
and maintenance of the Project (Pl. Exh. 4, par. 
1-!). 
In 1946 it became 1apparent that the expendi-
ture of $7,600,000.00 by the United Sta:tes would 
not be sufficient to complete the Project. N egotia-
tions were then undertaken with the United States 
towards a supplemental contract under which the 
United States would commit itself to expend ·a total 
of $11,400,000.00 towards the construction of the 
Project, which :appellant would repay in forty equal 
annual installments (Fdg. 5, Tr. 1'20). 
To accomplish that objective it became neces-
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sary for the subscribers of appellant's stock either 
(a) to amend their respective subscription contracts 
and thereby increase their respective indebtednesses 
to appellant to secure payment of the additional 
indebtedness by the appellant to the United States 
or (b) to proportionately reduce their respective 
amounts of stock subscribed for (Tr. 36, 37). All 
of the subscribers, including respondent, elected to 
amend their respective subscription contracts :and 
proportionately assume the additional indebtedness 
to appellant. However, the additional obligation for 
which respondent would thereby become indebted 
to appellant would exceed its debt limitation as 
fixed ·by the then existing Section 100-10-18 (g), 
Utah Code Annotated 1943 by the sum of $6,000.00 
(Complaint par. 6 - R. 4, 5; Tr. 37, 107, 109; Fdg. 
6- R. 121). 
On November 20, 1946 respondent adopted an 
Ordinance declaring that the interest of respondent 
required the execution of the Amendatory Subscrip-
tion ·Contract and calling for an election of the quali-
fied electorate of the respondent District to vote 
thereon. 'The Ordinance contained verbatim the 
language of the entire proposed Amendlatory Sub-
scription ·Con tract ( Df. Exh. 24) . 
·On December 2, 1946, being two days prior to 
ilie election, respondent ·delivered to appellant re-
spondent's check in the sum of $6,000.00 (Fdg. 7-
R. 121; Pl. Exh. '7). 
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The election by the qualified voters of the re-
spondent District was held on December 4, 1946 
and the proposed Amendatory Subscription Con-
tract was approved by !a majority of the votes cast 
(Df. Exh. 25, p. 3). 
On December 20, 1946 appellant entered into 
a supplemental contract with the United States 
(Pl. Exh. 5) under the terms of which the United 
States agreed to expend a total of $11,400,000.00 
in the construction of the Proje'Ct and appellant 
agreed to pay to the United States the cost thereof, 
\vithout interest, not to exceed $'11,400,000.00 (Pl. 
Exh. 5, pa1·. 7). Payments were to be m1ade in forty 
equal annual installments, the first of which would 
become due and payable on January t5 of the year 
following six months' notice from the 'Secretary 
of Interior that the $11,400,000.00 have been ex-
pended or that the works were ready for use (Pl. 
Exh. 5, par. 9). 
On February 3, 194 7 respondent ~and appellant 
entered into an Amendatory Subscription Contract 
(Pl. Exh. 6) wherein paragraph 15 of the original 
Subscription Contract (Pl. Exh. 4) was amended 
to read as follows: 
u15. Anything herein to the contr:ary 
notwithstanding, it is agreed that the total 
aggregate liability of the District for pay-
ment under the terms of this contract 
"(a) To the Association (appellant), 
for the purch:ase price of the stock of the Dis-
trict (respondent) in the Association shall 
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not exceed the sum of $912,000, less $6,000 
previously paid by the District to the Asso-
ciation on the purchase price of said stock; 
and 
''(b) To the Association, on account of 
the default of some other stockholders in the 
payment of ~he purchase price of the stock 
of such other stockholders in the Association 
shall not exceed the sum of $319;200." 
None of the previous contr:acts between the ap-
pellant and the United States obligated the United 
States to complete the ·Project so on February 2, 
194:9 appellant entered into a further contract in 
writin,g with the United States whereby the United 
States agreed, among other things, to expend such 
sums of money in excess of $11,400,000.00 ras may 
be necessary to complete the Project and appellant 
agreed to use the Project water supply and facilities 
an·d to pay therefor annual rates as fixed by the 
United S;tates ('Fdg. 5- R. 120) 'The United ·states 
agreed to suspend the equal annual installment pay-
ments on the ·$11,400,000.00 required under the 
Supplemental Contract ·(Pl. Exh. 5) until the ex-
penditures in excess thereof made by the United 
·states have been paid in full by the appellant to the 
United 'S·ta:tes. 
None of the payments provided for in the 
$11,400,000.00 ·contract between appellant and the 
United States has become due or payable by appel-
lant to the United States and no payment thereunder 
will become due until after the expenditures on the 
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Project in excess of $11,400,000.00 have been repaid 
by appellant to the United States, which will not 
occur until several years in the future (Fdg. 5 -
R. 121). No contract exists between the respondent 
District and the United States pertaining to this 
Project. 
The $6,000.00 paid by respon·dent to appellant 
was invested by appellant in government bonds on 
or about the first part of May, 1947, and the inter-
est earned thereon ·as of December 31, 1961 was 
$~,2·58.9'2, which has been re-invested by the appel-
lant (Fdg.11-R.122). 
On February 5, 194·7, being two days after the 
execution of the Amendatory Subscription Contrla.ct, 
a resolution was unanimously adopted by all of the 
stockholders of appellant corporation, in·cluding re-
spondent, providing that the $6,000.00 paid to ap-
pellant by respondent be credited to the account of 
respondent on its contr1actual obligation for the pur-
chase of stock in the appellant corporation, and that 
the $6,000.00 be deducted from the first contract 
·assessments (Df. Exh. 29, p. 3). On M·arch 14, 1947, 
being six weeks after the execution of the Amenda-
tory Subscription Contract, a motion was passed by 
the Board of Directors of appellant corporation 
providing that the $6,000.00 paid to appellant by 
respondent not be mingled witfu the appellant's gen-
eral funds, but th1at it be placed in a separate ac-
count and invested at the highest rate of interest 
consistent with safety with the interest on the in-
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vestment to accrue to the credit of respondent (Fdg. 
10- R. 12'2; Pl. Exh. 1, p. 3). 
From 1947 to 1960, inclusive, the auditor's re-
ports on appellant's books s'how that the '$6,000.00, 
together with interest accruals, was credited to the 
stock subscription account of respondent (Fdgs. 12, 
13 - R. 12·2, 123). In 1961 the !auditor's report was 
changed to show that the $6,000.00, together with 
interest accruals, was credited to the general stock-
holders equity account (Df. Exh. 23, p. 4; Tr. 88, 
89). 
No question arose with respect to the interest 
accruals on the investment of the $6,000.00 until 
March 1'1, 1955, at whieh time director Harris ad-
vised the 'Board of Directors of appellant corpora-
tion that such moneys belonged to the appellant 
and would have to remain with appellant until 
the first payment is made on the subscription con-
tract debt (Tr. 14; Pl. Exh. 8, p. 2). The issue arose 
again on April 8, 1'960, at which time director Har--
ris again !advised that the $6,000.00 was a payment 
on respondent's subscription contract debt and the 
return of the bon·ds would, therefore, constitute a 
gift (Df. Exh. 30, p. 1). Finally, at the Board of 
Directors' meeting of appellant held on April 20, 
19612 a motion was passed, as 1amended on May 18, 
196'2, declaring that the interest accruals on the in-
vestment of the $6,000.00 are the property of ap-
pellant and that respondent ha·d no interest therein 
(Pl. Ex·h. 21, p. 5). Ther~after this suit was com-
to 
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menced on August 24, 1962 and was tried on June 
25, 1963 to the court sitting without a jury, the 
Honorable Joseph E. Nelson presiding. 
The trial court found that the $6,000.00 check 
was delivered to appellant on December 2, 1946 
upon a mutual understanding that the proceeds 
would be held and invested by !appellant until such 
time as payments to the United States would be re-
quired under appellant's contract with the United 
States and under the then proposed Amendatory 
Subscription Contract between respondent and ap-
pellant, 'and that the interest received from such in-
vestment would accrue to the credit of respondent 
(Fdg. 7- R. 121). It then concluded that appellant 
holds the $6,000.00 for the sole purpose of paying 
the same over to the United States when, as and if 
annual installments on the $11,400,000.00 to be paid 
to the United States by appellant commence under 
the contract between appellant and the United States 
(·Concl. 1 - R. 12'3). The trial court entered its 
Judgment ordering appellant to keep the said 
$6,000.00 invested at the ·highest rate of interest 
consistent with safety and to pay the sam'e over to 
the United States when the first payment shall be-
come due to the United 'States from appellant under 
the $11,400,000.00 contract. It then adjudged that 
the interest and dividends heretofore an'd ·hereafter 
received by appellant attributable to the investm·ent 
of the $6,000.00, including interest on interest, are 
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With such Findings, Conclusions and Judgment 
appellant strongly disagrees and urges that there is 
no competent evidence in the record to support such 
Findings an·d th1at the Conclusions and Judgment 
are 'Contrary to law. Wha:t is more, the trial court 
then ordered appellant to give respondent credit 
for all interest on any payments, whether classed 
as installments, 1assessments or otherwise, which may 
hereafter become due appellant by respondent under 
its stock subscription contract (Judgment - R. 
126). In so doing the trial court awarded respon-
dent relief beyond that to which respondent was 
entitled or claimed under the pleadings or proof. 
Appellant filed its Motion For New !Trial, spe-
cifically pointing out the errors of law committed 
by the trial court (R. 133, 134) and filed its Motion 
To Alter Fin.dings Of Fact, Conclusions :Qf Law and 
Judgment, specifying in detail the amendments 
necessary to conform to the evidence and law of 
this case (R. 12;7-132, incl.). On September 13, 1963 
the court entered its Order denying ·appellant's Mo-
tion To Alter Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law 
and Ju:dgment and Motion For New Trial (R. 137). 
On October '7, 1963 appellant filed its Noti·ce Of Ap-
pea1'herein (R. 138). 
ST~TEMEN·T OF POINTS 
~poiNT I. 
THE DELIVERY OF RES1PONDENT'S CHECK IN 
THE SUM OF $6,000.00 TO APPELLANT C'ONSTITUT-
ED A v~ouNTARY .A:ND UNCONDITION'AL PAYMENT 
ON RES'PONDENT'S INDE1BTEDNESS TO APPEL-
12 
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LANT, AND OWNERS'HlP THEREOF HAD TO PASS 
TO APPELLANT IN ORDER THAT THE INDE·BTED-
NESS WOULD THEREBY BE REDUCED BY $6,000.00. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RE'CEIVING EVI-
DENCE OF CONVERSATIONS PRE-DATING THE 
AMENDATORY SUBS'CRIPTION CONTRA!CT OF FEB-
RlTARY 3, 1947 WHICH TENDED TO ALTER AND 
MODIFY THE TERMS THERE10F IN VIOLATION '0·F 
THE P .AROL EVIDENCE RULE. 
'POINT III. 
THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUP-
PORT THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COU'RT THAT 
THE $6,000.00 WAS CONDITIONALLY DELIVERED 
TO APPELLANT UPON A MUTU~L UN'DERSTAND-
ING THAT THE SAME WOULD BE INVE·S'TED AND 
THE IN'TEREST RE,CEIVED FR10M SUC'H INVEST-
1\lENT 'rOULD ~CCRUE TO RESPONDENT OR THAT 
APPELLAN'T WAS BOUND THERE'BY. 
POINT. IV. 
THE CLAIMED O'RAL AGREEMENT WO·UIJD BE 
VOID AS BEING AN IIJLEGAL C·ONTRACT TO VIO-
L.ATE THE PROVISIONS OF THE THE·N EXISTING 
SECTION 100~10-18 (g), UTAH CODE ANNO·TATE'D 
1943, AND THE TRIAL COURT E 1RRED IN ITS C·ON-
CLUSIO·NS AND J'UDGMENT IN ENFORCING THE 
SAME. 
POINT V. 
THE CLAIMED ORAL A·GREEME·NT WOULD 
NlTLLIFY THE ELECTION O·F THE VOTERS OF RE-
SPONDENT DISTRICT HELD ON DECEMBER 4, 1946 
TO APPROVE THE PRO:POS'ED AMENDA'TORY SUB-
SCRIPTION CONTRACT AND WOUI ... D VOID THE 
.AMENDATORY SUBSCRIPTION ·CONTRACT DATEID 
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POINT VI. 
RE'S'PONDENT ACQUIRED N·o RIGHTS IN AND 
TO THE INTE'REST ACCRUALS FROM 'THE INVEST-
ME'NT OF THE $6,000.00 PAYMENT BY REASON OF 
THE M'OTION PASSED AT THE A'PPE'LLANT DIREC-
TO·RS' MEE'TING o·F MAROH 14, 1947. 
POINT VII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING FIND-
I'NGS OF F .ACT NOS. 9 TO 14, IN·CLUSIVE, AS 'TO 
E·VENTS SUBSEQUENT ·To THE EXECUTION OF 
THE AMENDATORY S'UB:SCRIPTI'ON CONTRACT BE-
TWEE'N 'THE PARTIES DA'TED FEBRUARY 3, 1947. 
POIN·T VIII. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS JU'D·GMENT BY 
GRANTING RE:UIEF TO RES~PONDENT BEYOND 
TH'AT TO WHIC:H IT WAS EN'TITLE'D OR CLAIMED 




THE DE'LIVERY ·O'F RES1PONDENT'S !CHE·CK IN 
THE SUM OF $6,000.00 TO APPE'ULA'N'T CO'NS'TTTU'T-
E1D A V'OVNTARY AN'D UNCONDITION·AL PAYMENT 
ON RESPONDENT'S INDEBTEDNESS TO APPEL-
L.ANT, AND OWNERS'HI'P THEREO~F HA·D TO PASS 
TO APPELLA!NT IN ORDER THAT THE IND'EBTED-
NESIS WOU:UD THEREBY BE REDUCED BY $'6,000.00. 
On December 2, 1946 respondent delivered to 
appellant its check in the sum of $6,000.00 (Fdg. 7 
- R. 1'21). The check itself does not recite what it 
was for, nor does it bear any conditions of delivery 
('Pl. Exh. ;7) nor wtas there any evidence to show 
that its delivery was !accompanied by a letter of 
transmittal or statements made at the time of de-
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livery imposing conditions thereon. The trial court 
made no finding as to whether it was a payment on 
the purchase price of the stock, nor a finding as 
to whether the indebtedness of respondent to appel-
lant was thereby or ever reduced. It simply made 
a v-ague finding that the ·check was delivered upon 
'a tnutual understanding that the proceeds would 
be held and invested by appellant until such time 
as payments to the United States would 'be required 
under appellant's contract with the United States 
and to appellant under the then proposed Amenda-
tory Subscription Contract (Fdg. 7 - R. 121). 
In spite of what the trial court said or did not 
say a;bout it, the $6,000.00 was a payment lby re-
spondent to appellant on the purchase price of the 
stock and is a fact accomplished. Likewise the 
$6,000.00 reduction of respondent's indebtedness to 
appellant by reason of staid payment is a fact ac-
conlplished. This, we submit, is the crux of this law-
suit. Both facts are unequivocally stated as having 
been accomplished in a formal instrument in writ-
ing, i.e. the Amendatory Subscription ~Contract be-
tween respondent 1and appellant dated Fe'bruary 3, 
1947, wherein the parties agreed that the total ag-
gregate liability of the respondent to appellant for 
the purchase prices of the stock 
" ... s'hall not exceed the sum of $912,-
000.00 less $6,000.00 PREVIOUSLY PAID 
by the District (respondent) to the Association 
(appellant) on the purchase price of the 
1'5 
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stock." (Emph!asis added) (Pl. Exh. 6, par. 
1'5) 
Thus, the avowed purpose of the $6,000.00 as form-
ally declared by respondent was a payment and 
corresponding reduction in the indebtedness. And 
it fits squarely into the elementary definition of a 
payment, i.e. the discharge of a debt in whole or in 
part, Words And Phrases, Payment, Vol. 31A, Pe1~­
manent E~dition, pp. 216, 233. And to constitute pay-
ment, money must pass from the debtor to the 
creditor for the purpose of extinguishing the d~bt, 
and the creditor must receive it for the same pur-
pose. 40 Am. Jur., Payment, Section 4, p. 716; Sec-
tion 2, p, 715. Having so agreed, avowed and de-
clared, how then can respondent now be heard to 
complain that the delivery of the $6,000.00 was not 
a payment an'd claim that it was a conditional de-
livery of money to be used for a special purpose? 
Suffice it to say, when the $6,000.00 check was de-
livered to appellant the money passed to appellant 
for the purpose of reducing respondent's indebted-
ness to appellant and as such became the property 
of appellant. It is just that simple, and it cannot 
be otherwise. 
Respondent conceded in its answer to Inter-
rogatory No. 3 (R. 22) that its indebtedness to ap-
pellant was reduced by $6,000.00 at the time the 
Amendatory Subscription Contract was entered into. 
H1aving thus conceded, that should have put an end 
to this controversy without anything further. And 
16 
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so appellant filed its Motion For Summary Judg-
ment, dated November 26, 1962 (R. 91, 92) sup-
ported by the Affidavit of its secretary (R. 28, 29, 
30) together with attached Ex·hi'bits "A" to "E", 
inclusive (R. 31-80, incl.) 1and Exhibit "F" (R. 93-
96, incl.), which we submit should have been granted 
by the trial court but which was denied ( R. 110) . 
This we urge was error. 
The tri1al court then went on to ·hear the case 
and decide the same without making findings on 
whether the $6,000.00 constituted a payment or 
whether the respondent's indebtedness had been re-
duced. The proper application of the law to the 
evidence in this case would compel findings in the 
affirmative thereon. ·The failure of the trial court to 
so do led to its erroneous Judgment in this case, 
which we submit must be unequivocally reversed. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED I·N RE,CEIVING EVI-
DENCE OF CONVERSATI'ONS PRE-DATING THE 
Al\IENDATORY S!UBS,CRlPTION C·ONTRACT OF FE·B-
RUARY 3, 1947 WHI,CH TENDED TO ALTER AND 
MODIFY THE TERMS THERE·OF IN Vl'OLATION o~F 
THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE. 
The rights and duties of the parties were fixed 
by the terms of the written Amendatory ,Subscrip-
tion Contract dated February 3, 194'7 as of that 
date (Pl. Exh. 6) All of the negotiations, deals, ar-
rangements and the like made prior thereto or con-
temporaneously therewith pertaining to the subject 
matter thereof were merged into that instrument. 
17 
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The parties thereby agreed that the total indebted-
ness of the respondent to the app,ellant for the pur-
chase price of the stock shall not exceed the sum of 
$912,000.00 (eight percent of $11,400,000.00) less 
$6,000.00 previously paid thereon, i.e. $906,000.00 
(Pl. Exh. 6, par. I5). Thus the indebtedness in-
curred by respondent was $6,000.00 less than it 
would 'have been 'had the $6,000.00 not been paid. 
T'he parties thereby formally agreed that the 
$6,000.00 hlad been paid for that very purpose. It 
is just that plain. There is no ambiguity to explain. 
Nor did the trial court make any finding that the 
particular provision of the Amendatory Subscrip-
tion Contract was ambiguous. 
It is elementary that parol evidence is inad-
missible to vary the provisions of a written contract 
unless the contract 'Contains ambiguities which must 
be resolved. Davis v. Payne & Day Inc., 10 Utah 
(21d) 53, 348 Pac. f2d) 33'7; Hatch v. Adams, 8 
Utah (2d) 812, 3'29 Plac. (2d) 285; Continental Bank 
& Trust Company v. Bybee, 6 Utah (2d) 98, 306 
Pac. ('2d) 773. 
The parol evidence rule forecloses all events 
which precede or accompany a written integration. 
Wilson v. Gardener, 10 Utah (2d) 89, 348 Pac. (2d) 
9'31; Degnan, Rarol Evidence - Utah Version, 5 
Utah Law Review 158. 
In the instant case the trial court permitted 
the witness John 0. Beesley to testify, over appel-
lant's dbjection (Tr. 39) as to a conversation which 
18 
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he had with Fisher Harris in Salt Dake City, Utah 
shortly after Novem·ber 8, 1946 pertaining to a plan 
and scheme of Mr. Beesley for the respondent to 
advance $6,000.00 to the appellant to be invested 
in government ·bonds with the interest thereon to 
accrue to respondent ( Tr. 39-42, incl.). Appellant 
moved to strike the entire 'answer of Mr. Beesley 
as being violative of the parol evidence rule (Tr. 
42, 43), which was ~denied pro forma ('Tr. 43) Ap-
pellant renewed its motion to strike the testimony 
of the witness /Beesley with respect to the conver-
sation with Fisher Harris as /being violative of the 
parol evidence rule ( Tr. 60, 61), which the trial 
court denied (Tr. 67). We submit that under the 
authorities cited above the trial court erred in re-
receiving such parol evidence over the objection of 
appellant. In so doing, it permitted respondent to 
impeach a provision of a written contract executed 
by it over sixteen years ago with all of the formali-
ties of an election and the resolutions of its Board 
by the testimony of one witness as to his memory 
sixteen years prior. 
The fact is that the Amendatory Subscription 
Contract is clear and unambiguous in its terms. 
There is no ambiguity to explain. The claimed oral 
agreen1ent which respondent was successful in per-
suading the trial court to enforce imposes upon ap-
pellant the duties of a trustee, requires it to keep 
the $6,000.00 invested at the highest rate of inter-
est ·consistent with safety, holds it accountable to 
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respondent for the interest earned on the invest-
ment, requires it to hold the $6,000.00 and all in-
terest thereon separate and apart from all other 
moneys of appellant, and requires it to give respon-
dent credit for 1all interest on any payments, whether 
classed as installments, assessments or otherwise, 
which may hereafter become due to appellant from 
respondent. How can it be said that this does not 
impose duties and obligations on appellant in addi-
tion to those it assumed under the written contract? 
The additional duties and obligations imposed on 
appellant thereby clearly alter, if not repudiate, the 
express written terms of the Amendatory Subscrip-
tion Contract. In addition thereto, it gives the re-
spondent more than it bargained for, i.e. the interest 
earned on money already paid under the express 
terms of the Amendatory Subscription Contract to 
appellant on the purchase price of the stock. 
'To say that such an oral agreement merely ex-
plains the particular provision of the written con-
tract is absurd, particularly where there is no am-
biguity to explain. On the contrary, the claimed 
oral agreement not only alters !and modifies the 
terms of the written contract but completely and 
radically changes it in purpose land effect, if not 
repudiates it. This is a classic example of the wis-
dom i'n the parol evidence rule, which !appropriately 
has become known as a "common sense rule". Jensen 
Used Cars v. Rice, 7 Utah (2d) ·276, 323 Pac. (2d) 
2'59. Under no circumstances was parol evidence of 
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the conversations admissible in this case, and the 
tt·ial court clearly erred in receiving such evidence 
0\"Pl' the olJjection Of 'appellant. 
POINT III. 
TIIERE IS NO COMPETE'NT EVIDENCE TO SUP-
PORT THE FINDINGS O·F THE TRIAL COURT THAT 
THE $6,000.00 WAS CONDITIONALLY DELIVERED 
TO APPELLANT UPON A MUTUA:L UNDERSTAND-
ING TI-IAT THE SAME WOULD BE INVESTED AND 
THE INTEREST RECEIVED FROM SUCH INVEST-
MENT \YOtTLD ACCRUE TO RESPONDENT OR THAT 
APPELLAN'T WAS BO·UND THERE1BY. 
In spite of the fact that the trial court er-
roneously received parol eviden·ce to show that a 
claimed ortal agreement or understan'ding had been 
reached between respondent and appellant, respon-
dent still offered no competent evidence from which 
the trial court could find that the $6,000.00 check 
\vas delivered to appellant upon a mutual under-
standing that the proceeds would be held land in-
vested by appellant until such time as payment to 
the United States would be required under appel-
lant's contract with the United States and that the 
interest received from such investment would accrue 
to the credit of respondent. 
The only evidence offered by respondent 1as to 
the claimed oral agreement prior to the execution of 
the Amendatory Subscription Contract of Febru-
ary 3, 1947 was the testimony of the Witness John 
0. Beesley, over appellant's objection (Tr. '39), re-
lating to one conversation with Fisher Harris, one 
21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of ap·pellant's directors and its counsel, shortly after 
November 8, 1946 (Tr. 39-4'2, incl.). The testimony 
of Fisher Harris refutes any such conversation 
(Tr. 108), although apparently the trial court chose 
to believe Mr. Beesley. Mr. Beesley testified that 
he had :a meeting with Mr. Harris shortly after 
November 8, 1946 in Salt Lake City, Utah and that 
only he and Mr. Harris were present (Tr. 40). 'Mr. 
Beesley testified that he suggested a plan or scheme 
to Mr. Harris whereby respon·dent could avoid ex-
ceeding its debt limitation by 1a d van c in g the 
$6,000.00 to appellant and that the money be in-
vested in government bonds and the interest accrue 
to the respondent (·Tr. 41). Mr. Beesley was unable 
to state the substance of the statements of Mr. Har·· 
ris in response thereto (Tr. 41, 42), but merely 
suggested th1at it met with the approval of Mr. 
Harris (Tr. 42). Appellant moved to strike the 
entire answer of Mr. Beesley as not binding on ap-
pellant (Tr. 4'2), which was den'ied pro forma (Tr. 
43). Appellant renewed its motion to strike the 
testimony of the witness ·Beesley with respect to the 
conversation with Fis'her Harris individually as not 
binding on appell1ant corporation (Tr. 59, 60), which 
was denied (Tr. 67). 
Even assuming what Mr. Beesley said to be 
true, which apparently the trial court believed, cer-
tainly the appellant corporation is not bound by any 
oral "1approval" by director Harris (which he de-
nies) given during a conference solely between him 
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and the witness John 0. Beesley. The law is well 
settled that in order to bind a corporation the Board 
must act as a Board, either in a regular session or 
speci1al session called for a purpose. Lockwitz v. 
P'ine Tree Mine & Mill Company, 37 Uta'h 349, 108 
Pac.1128, Jackson v. Bonneville Irrigation District, 
66 Utah 404, 243 Pac. 107. The then existing Sec-
tion 18-2-20, ·utah Code Annotated 1943 specific-
ally provided that ~the corporate powers of the cor-
poration shall be exercised by the Board of Direc-
tors. An~d in 19 Am. Jur., Corporations, Sectio·n 
91,8, p. 909 it is stated: 
uThe authority of the directors or trus-
tees is conferred upon them as a board, and 
they can bind the corporation only by acting 
together as 1a board. A majority of them in 
their individual names cannot act for the 
board itself and bind the corporation. In 
order to exercise their powers they must meet 
so that they may hear each other's views, deli-
'berate, and then decide ... " 
·Thus, respondent cannot rely on the 1alleged con-
versation between the witness John 0. Beesley and 
director Harris as binding on the appellant corpor-
ation, and it was error for the trial court to attempt 
to so bind the appellant corpor!ation. Th·at being the 
only evidence offered by respondent to support its 
claim that such an oral agreement had been reached 
prior to the execution of the Amendatory Subscrip-
tion iContract, the finding of the trial court thereon 
cannot stand ~and must be set aside. 
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We are mindful of the rule that the trial court 
as the trier of the fact ·has great latitude in deter-
mining the truth of the facts in iss.ue. However, in 
so doing it cannot rely on incompetent evidence and 
close its eyes to competent evidence which is undis-
puted. Thus, in the instant case all of the documen-
tary evidence as to the events which led up to the 
execution of the Amendatory Su'bscription Contract 
on February 3, 1'94 7 negative any agreement or un-
derstanding between the parties prior to the execu-
tion thereof with respect to the accrual of interest 
on the $6,000.00 payment. Respondent's own records 
negative this. 
Thus, in the minutes of the meeting of the Board 
of Directors of respondent dated November 20, 1946 
(Df. Exh. 2'5) where the proposed Amendatory Sub-
scription Contract was approved by respondent, in-
cluding the payment of $6,000.00, no reference is 
made therein pertaining to the investment or ac-
crual of interest on the $6,000.00. Nor does the Or-
dinlance passed ·by respondent on November 20, 194·6 
fDf. Exh. 24) and submitted to a vote of its elec-
torate on December 4, 1946 (Df. Exh. 2'5) make any 
reference to the investment of the $6,000.00 or to 
the accrual of interesit thereon. In fact, the Ordin-
ance told the people of the resporulent District that 
the $6,000.00 had been paid to the appellant and its 
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Furthermore, no reference is made to the invest-
ment of the $6,000.00 nor to the accrual of interest 
to respondent in the minutes of 
Board of Directors' meeting of appel-
lant on November 8, 1946 (Df. Exh. 26), al-
though Mr. Beesley noted that a problem 
would arise as to respondent's exceeding its 
debt limitation; 
Special Stockholders' meeting of appel-
lant dated December 20, 1946 (Df. Exh. 27), 
wherein the supplemental contract between 
appellant and the United States was approved 
by the stockholders; 
Special Board of Directors' meeting of 
appellant on December ~20, 1946 (Df. Exh. 
28), wherein the execution of the supplement-
al contl:'!act between appellant and the United 
States was approved; or the 
Board of Directors' meeting of appellant 
on February 5, 1'947 (Df. Exh. 31). 
However, at the annual Stockholders' meeting 
of appell~t on February 5, 194 7 attended by Mr. 
Beesley, representing respondent (Df. Exh. 29), it 
was unanimously resolved by all of the stockholders, 
including respondent, that the amount of $6,000.00 
be credited to the account of respondent on its con-
tractual obligation for the purchase of stock in the 
appelllant and that it be deducted from the first 
contract assessments. This meeting was only two 
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days after the execution of the Amendatory Sub-
scription Contract, and still no mention was m1ade 
of the so-called prior agreement or understanding 
to invest the $6,000.00 and credit the interest there-
on to respondent. It is in·conceivable that if such 
a prior agreement was reached that respondent 
would not even mention it, and then vote in favor 
of the foregoing resolution without s,uch agreement's 
being incorporated therein. It was only at a sub-
sequent meeting, being nearly six weeks after the 
execution of the Amendatory Subscription Contract, 
that the matter of investing the $6,000.00 and the 
accrual of interest to the credit of the respondent 
was first mentioned in 1any minute or document 
(Pl. Exh. 1, p. 3). Although we might now criticize 
the motion contained in the foregoing minutes as 
being unwise, in law and in fact the effect thereof 
can only be a gratuity for which no consideration 
was given 1and has since been revoked by appellant 
as will be hereinafter demonstrated. Suffice it to 
say the foregoing resolution forms the basis for 
respondent's contentions in this case. It should be 
obvious from all of the documentary evidence that 
the alleged o~al agreement is simply a figment of 
somebody's imagination and came as an after-
thought to the purely gratuitous motion approved 
by appell1ant's directors on March 14, 1947. 
1P0'INT. IV. 
THE 'CLAI'MED OiRAL AGRE.EMENT WOULD BE 
VOID AS BEING AN ILLEGAL CONTRACT TO VIO-
LATE THE PROVISIO·NS 'OF THE THEN EXISTING 
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SECTION 100-10-18 (g), UTAH CODE ANNOTATE'D 
19·13, AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CON-
CLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT IN ENFORCING THE 
SAME. 
The trial court found that respondent ~deliv­
Pred to appellant its check in the sum of $6,000.00 
pursuant to an oral agreement under the terms of 
which the proceeds would be held and invested by 
appellant until such time as payments to the United 
States would be required under appellant's contract 
with the United States, with the interest received 
from such investment to accrue to the credit of re-
spondent ( Fdgs. 6, 7 - Tr. 121 ) . By its Judgment 
the ~trial court purports to enforce such oral agree-
men (Judgment-Tr. 125). 
We can only conclude therefrom that the in-
debtedness of respondent to appellant has not yet 
been reduced by $6,000.00, nor will it so be reduced 
until ~ppellant levies an assessment against its 
stockholders to obtain the funds necessary to make 
appellant's first annual payment to the United 
States under the $11,400,000.00 contract (Pl. Exh. 
5). Yet unless respondent's indebtedness to appel-
lant was reduced by $6,000.00 at some time prior 
to the execution of the Amendatory Subscription 
Contract dated February 3, 1947 the indebtedness 
incurred by respondent thereby exceeded respon-
dent's debt limitation imposed by the then existing 
Section 100-10-18 (g), Utah Code Annotated ~943 
by the sum of $6,000.00. This we repeatedly called 
to the attention of the trial court, which it inten-
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tionally ignored ('Tr. 22, 30). That section fixed a 
limitation on the !aggregate inde'btedness of metro-
politan water districts at 107o of the assessed valu-
ation of all taxable property within the district. It 
was amen~ded in 1957 to exclude any indebtedness 
to a water users association (appellant) from which 
the district procures water. Section 73-8-18 (g), 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Laws of 
Utah 1957, Chapter 159, Section 1. 
The fundamental purpose in p a y i n g the 
$6,000.00 to appellant ~at that time was to avoid re-
spondent's exceeding its statutory debt limitation. 
R~espondent so alleges in its Complaint (Complaint, 
par. 6 - Tr. 4, 5). So states the resolution adopted 
by appellant's stockholders, including respondent 
('Df. Exh. 29, p. 3). The witness John 0. Beesley, 
as chairman of the Board of Directors of respondent~ 
so testified ('Tr. 37) an·d the trial court so found 
( Fdg. 6, R. 121). That being so, the very purpose 
and effect of the claimed oral agreement found by 
the trial court would violate the then existing Sec-
tion 100-10-18 (g), Utah Code Annotated 194'3. 
Yet the trial court enforced the cl1aimed oral agree-
ment in spite of the law adopted in this state and 
in the whole country that every contract in violation 
of law is void. T·hus, in the case of Baker v. Latses, 
60 Utah 38, 206 Pac. 553, this court states on page 
555 of the Pacific Reporter: 
"It is the generally accepted ·doctrine of 
this country that every contract in violation 
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of law is void. It is equally true that our 
courts will not lend their aid to the enforce-
tnent nor permit a recovery of compensation 
under contl'lacts made and entered into in vi-
olation of the law prohibiting them or declar-
ing them to be unlawful." (Citing H1addock 
v. Salt Lake City, 23 Utah 521, 65 Pac. 491) 
Under the claimed oral agreement which the 
trial court saw fit to enforce ownership of the 
$6,000.00 could not under ·any circumstance pass 
to appellant. That being so, there could be no cor ... 
responding reduction in the indelbtedness of respon-
dent to appellant. All that could pass to appellant 
\vould be the bear legal title with ·conditions imposed, 
and the equitable title would remain in the respon-
dent. 54 Am. Jur., Trusts, Section 96, p. 89; Sectior;~ 
98, p. 90. And so we ask, under whlat possible theory 
could such a transaction operate to reduce the in-
debtedness of respondent to appellant? We submit 
that there is none. 
Nor can it be said that the payment of the 
$6,000.00 to ap·pellant operated las a reduction of 
some other indebtedness of respondent. Respondent 
was not, and is not indebted to the United States 
for respondent's share of the cost of the Project. 
No con.tract exists between respondent and the 
United States whereby respondent is or ever was 
obligated to pay one red cent to the United States 
on this Project. Furthermore, the money was not 
paid over to the United States. Respondent's indebt-
edness is, and always has been to the appellant un-
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der the original and Amendatory Stock Subscrip-
tion C:ontract. Appellant is the one which is solely 
indebted to the United States and is the only one 
to whom the United States can look for payment. 
Respondent apparently concedes that its indebt-
edness to appellant was reduced by $6,000.00 at the 
time the Amendatory Subscription ·contract dated 
February 3, 1947 was entered in·to (R. 22). It makes 
this concession lap·parently in an effort to avoid hav-
ing exceeded its debt limitation, and at the same 
time asserts that it ·has retained the equitable own-
ership of the $6,000.00 and all benefits accruing 
therefrom. We respectfully submit that the two 
cannot co-exist. The former is conclusively estab-
lished by the record before this court. The l1atter is 
predicated upon a claimed oral agreement which is 
not only contrary to the express provisions of the 
written Amendatory Subscription Contract but, if 
ever made, would be clearly illegal as a violation of 
the debt limitation statute and as such the trial court 
erred in enforcing the same. 
POIN'T V. 
THE CLAIMEID ORAL AGREEME·NT WOULD 
NUIJLIFY THE E'LECTION OF THE VOTERS OF RE-
S1PONDENT DISTRI~c·T HELD ON DE'CEMBE·R 4, 1946 
TO APPR·OVE THE PRO,POSED AMENDATORY SUB-
srCRIPTION CONTRACT A"ND WOULD VOID THE 
AMENDATORY SUBSIC·RIPTION CONTRACT DATED 
FE1B1R'UARY 3 1947 AND THE EXE'CUTION THERE-
. ' 
OF. 
On December 2, 1946 respondent delivered to 
appellant its check in the amount of $6,000.00. Two 
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days later the proposition voted on by the electorate 
of the respondent District on December 4, 1946 was 
as follows: 
"Shall the Metropolitan Water District 
of Provo City be authorized to enter into an 
amendatory contract with the Provo River 
\\rater Users' Association for the purpose of 
continuing construction of the Deer Creek Di-
vision of the Provo River Prdject for accru-
ing a water supply for the Distirct, on terms 
and conditions set forth in the ordinance by 
which this election is called? (Emphasis add-
ed) ( Df. Exh. 24, Ordinance, Section ·9) 
The foregoing Ordinance set out verbatim the 
terms of the proposed Amendatory Subscription Con-
tract, including the whole of paragraph 15 (Df. Exh. 
24). Section 13 of the foregoing Ordinance required 
publication thereof in a newspaper or posting the 
same in three ·public places. Section 14 thereof re-
quired that a copy of the Ordinance be posted in a 
conspicuous position in each polling place and each 
voting ·booth. The Ordin1ance told the people that 
$6,000.00 ·had been paid to appellant on the purchase 
price of the stock and that the indebtedness had been 
reduced by that amount. It was upon those terms 
and conditions that the majority of the electorate 
voted in fuvor of the proposition and approved the 
Amendatory Subscription Contract (Df. Exh. 25). 
And it is conceivable that had the terms and condi-
tions been otherwise the voters would have rejected 
the proposition. 
Pursuant to the mandate of its voters, the 
Board of Directors of the respondent District auth-
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orized the execution of the Amendatory Subscrip-
tion Contract (Df. Exh. 2'5). Having told its voters 
thJat the $6,000.00 'had been paid and by reason 
thereof the indebtedness had been reduced by that 
amount, 1and having so agreed in the Amendatory 
Subscription Contract, how can respon·dent be heard 
to now say otherwise? 
For the trial court to now find that by reason 
of the oral agreement respondent had not in fact 
made a payment of $6,000.00 on the purchase price 
of the stock, with no corresponding reduction in its 
indebtedness, is not only contrary to the express 
language of the Amendatory Subscription Contract 
but is in effect a determination that the Amendatory 
Subscription Contr1act obligated respondent for an 
in,debtedness of $6,000.00 more than the electorate 
approved and $6,000.00 more than the Board of Di-
rectors of the respondent District authorized its of-
ficers to incur. We point this out not by way of 
urging that this court hold that the Amendatory 
Subscription Contract is void, but to point out the 
fallacy of respondent's theory of the case 'and the 
dilemma created by the Findings, Conclusions and 
Judgment of the trial court. 
POINT VI. 
RESPONDENT A~CQUIRED N'O RIGHTS IN AND 
TO THE INTEREST A:CCRUALS FROM THE INVEST-
M,ENT OF THE $6,000.00 'PAYMENT BY REASON OF 
THE MOTION PASSED AT THE APPELLANT DIREC-
T101RS' MEETING OF MAR·OH 14, 1947. 
'On March 14, 1947, being six weeks after 
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the execution of the Amendatory Subscription Con-
tract, the Board of 'Directors of appellant corpora-
tion passed the following motion: 
"It was moved by attorney Harris that 
the $6,000.00 paid 'by the Metropolitan Water 
District of Provo on its su'bscriptron contract 
be not mingled with the Association's general 
funds, but that it be placed in a separate a·c-
count and invested at the highest rate of in-
terest consistent with safety; the president, 
treasurer and Mr. Beesley be and are ·hereby 
authorized to make the investment and report 
their ·action. Interest on the investment to ac-
crue to the credit of the Metropolitan Water 
Di'strict." (Fdgs. 9, 10 - 'R. 12·2; Pl. Exh. 1, 
p. 3) 
Prior to that date nothing appeared in any of 
the documentary evidence as to the investment of 
the $6,000.00 or the accrual of interest thereon to 
the credit of respondent. 'The trial court foun·d that 
the foregoing resolution was made ''in recognition 
of 1and in pursuance of the mutual understanding 
referred to herein ... " and undoubtedly this resolu-
tion was influential, if not determinative, in the de-
cision of the trial court. What the trial court re-
fused to consider is that ·all of the negotiations, ar-
rangements and the like which occurred prior to or 
contemporaneously with the execution of the Amen-
datory 'Subscription Contr1act merged into that con-
tract and are past history. Appellant raised a time-
ly objection thereto (Tr. H2), which the trial court 
denied ('Tr. 33) . 
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We can only look to the terms of the Amendatory 
Subscription Contract to ascertain the rights, duties 
and obligations of the partie'S thereto as of Feb-
ruary 3, 19'4 7 pertaining to the subject matter of 
the contract. Any subsequent enforceable agreement 
must stand or fall on a new consideration or lacl{ 
of consideration. The record is clear that the fore .. 
going motion was not founded on any considera-
tion's passing from re'Spondent to appellant. No evi-
dence was offered by respondent to show that any 
consideration passed, an·d we do not believe that re-
spondent se,riously contends otherwise. Yet re'spon-
dent urged th1at the trial court invoke its powers 
of equity to find some equitable principal under 
which respondent might be entitled to the interest 
earned on appellant's investment, i.e. that either an 
implied or constructive contract or a resulting trust 
'had been created by reason of appellant's actions. 
However, respondent ignores the elementary con-
cept th·at each and every equitable principle must 
be founded on a valuable consideration. 12 Am. Jur., 
Contracts, Section 6, p. 504; 54 Am. Jur., Trusts, 
Section 194, p. 153. 
We might now criticize the resolution adopted 
by appellant on March 14, 1947 as being unwise, but 
in law and in fact the effect thereof can only be an 
intention to make a gift at some time in the future 
and it ·has since been revoked by appellant (24 Am. 
Jur., Gifts, Section 2, pp. 730, 731; Section 38, P· 
752). Revocation of any prior intention of making 
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a gift is manifested in the minutes of the appellant 
Directors' meetings held on March 11, 1955 (Pl. 
Exh. 8, p. 2), again on April 8, 1960 (Df. Exh. 30, 
p. 1) and was expressly revoked at the appellant's 
Directors' meeting of April 20, 1962, as amended 
May 18, 1962 (Pl. Exh. 21, p. 5). 
Furthermore, appellant had no power to make 
a gift. 13 Am. J1tr., Corporations, Section 806, p. 
Bf!O. It would be akin to a charitable gift by ·a non-
charitable corporation, which are generally held to 
be ultra vires unless beneficial to the corporation. 
l!nion Pac-ific Railro(l;d Company v. Trustees, Inc., 
8 Utah (2d) 101, 329 Pac. (2d) 398. Appellant 
certainly would not benefit therefrom. The then ex-
isting Section TS-2-16, Uta;h Code Annotated 194·3 
(Section 16-2-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953) did 
not expressly empower corporations organized there-
under to make a gift, ·and ~a strict interpretation 
is to be given to the express powers of a corpora-
tion. Zions Savings Bank & Trust Company v. Tropic 
and East Fork Irrigation Company, 102 Utah 101, 
126 Pac. (2d) 1053; Summit Range & Livestock 
Co. v. Rees, 1 Utah ('2d) 195, 265 Pac. f2d) 381. 
Nor does the resolution of appellant's Board 
of Directors dated March 14, 1'947 constitute a rati-
fication of the claimed oral agreement since to be 
an effective ratification by the corporation it must 
be ru!Companied ·by an intent to ratify the unauthor-
ized transaction. 13 Am. Jur., Corporations, Section 
977, p. 990. No mention is made therein that a prior 
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oral agreement had been made which the corpora-
tion was thereby intending to ratify, nor is there 
any evidence at 1any place in the record manifesting 
such intent. Furthermore, the claimed prior oral 
!agreement would be an agreement to violate the debt 
limitation statute as demonstrated under Point lV 
above, and a corpoiiation cannot ratify a contract 
which is -illegal or opposed to public policy. 13 Am. 
Jur., Corporations, Section 980, p. 932; 7 A.L.R. 
1446, 1494. 
Admittedly, the foregoing resolution, its crea-
tion and existence are difficult to explain. The wit-
ness Fisher Harris, who made the motion, has no 
independent recollection of the f1acts or circum-
stances which surrounded or prompted the motion 
('Tr. 111). He did testify, however, that when the 
Amendatory Subscription ·Contract was executed on 
February 3, 1947 it was expected that the payments 
under the $11,400,000.00 contract would begin in 
the near future ( Tr. 11'7) . We can only surmise that 
it was not expected to raccumulate enough interest 
over which to argue. 
However, when the "excess costs" contract was 
executed on February 2, 1949, thereby suspending 
payments by the appellant to the United States un-
der the $11,400,000.00 contract before they began, 
the interest attri'buted to the investment of the 
$6,000.00 began to accumul1ate and reached the sum 
of $'2,2·58.'92 as of December 31, 1961. In principle 
the amount of the accumulated interest should have 
36 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
no bearing on this controversy. However, as a prac-
tical matter it did. 
And having once reached the litigation stage, 
the rights, duties and obligations of the parties must 
be settled on accepted principles of law and not on 
the basis of a gratuitous resolution appearing in 
the records of the appellant, which can only have 
the legal effect of a declaration of an intention to 
make a gift at some time in the future. No enforce-
able rights were created in respondent thereby and 
the trial court clearly erred in 1attempting to en-
force the same. 
POINT VII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ER!RE'D IN MAKING FIND-
INGS OF FA:CT NOS. 9 'TO 14, INCUUSIVE, A:S TO 
EVENTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE EXEOUTI10'N O'F 
THE AMENDATO'RY SUBSCRIPTlON CON'TRAC'T BE-
TWEEN THE PARTIES DATE'D FE'BRU'ARY 3, 1947. 
'The only purpose for which evidence of events 
subsequent to the Amendatory 'Subscription Con-
tract could be offered would be to s·how that the 
Amendatory Subscription ·Contract thereafter had 
been amended or that new rights and duties of the 
parties h~d been created with reference to the 
$6,000.00. However, such evidence was not offered 
by respondent for that purpose but was offered for 
the purpose of showing a "confirmation of a prior 
understanding (Tr. 3'2, 50). Appellant made timely 
objections to all of such evidence ( Tr. 3'2, 50, 51), 
whieh objections the trial court ·denied ('Tr. 3:3, 51, 
52). 
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Even so, respondent cannot successfully clain1 
that the Amendatory Subscription Contract dated 
February 3, 1947 was amended by the resolution of 
appellant's Board of Directors ·dated March 14, 1947. 
No cons} deration passed therefor. The minute en-
try ·does not constitute an agreement or contract 
which would be binding on appell1ant. It is unila:teral 
and nowhere in the record does it appear that the 
Board of iDirectors of the respondent District there-
after approved, agreed thereto or even commented 
thereon. It was strictly a declaration of intention 
by the Board of Directors of !appellant to at most 
make a gift to respondent at some time in the future. 
w~hat is more, the Board of Directors of appellant 
had no authority to bind the corporation to such a 
declaration. And so, with the entries m1ade by the 
auditors employed 'by appellant to make the auditor's 
reports. Certainly they ·have no power to bind ~the 
appellant by employing inept language sounding in 
legal opinions. Furthermore, the record does not 
show th1at such auditor's reports were ever formally 
approved by the Board of Directors of appellant. 
In fact, the testimony of the witness Jo'hn '0. Beesley 
shows affirmatively that no formal board action 
was taken thereon (Tr. 56). 
The trial court m1ade no finding that the Amen-
datory Subscription Contract dated February 3, 
1947 had been amended by the resolution of the 
Board of Directors of appellant, nor that any new 
rigllts, duties or obligations of the parties were ere-
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ated thereby. Thus, Findings Nos. 9 through 14, 
inclusive, covering events subsequent to the execu-
tion of the Amendatory Su'bscription Contract dated 
February 3, 1947 are immaterial and it was error 
for the trial court to make findings thereon as a 
basis for its Conclusions Of :Law and Judgment. 
POIN'T VIri. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS JUDGMENT :BY 
GRANTING RELIEF TO RESPONDE'NT BEY·ON·D 
THAT TO WHI,CH IT WAS EN'TITLED OR CLAIMED 
A~ BEYOND THE PLEADINGS AND 'PROOF IN 
THIS CASE. 
The affirmative relief sought by respondent in 
its Complaint was to compel appellant to hold the 
$6,000.00 and all interest accumulations thereon to 
respondent's credit and to pay over such amounts 
to the United States when, as and if moneys be-
come due and payable from appellant to the United 
States under appellant's contract with the United 
States. 
The Judgment of the trial court went far be-
yond, and orders appell1ant to 
(a) keep the $6,000.00 invested at the 
highest rate of interest consistent with safety; 
'(b) pay the $6,000.00 over to the Uni-
ted States when payments become due to the 
United States by appellant, and give respon-
dent credit for $6,000.00 on the first payment 
which will become due to !appellant by respon-
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(c) give respondent credit for any in-
terest and dividends heretofore or hereafter 
received by ·appellant attributable to the in-
vestment of the $6,000.00, including interest 
on interest, on any payments, whether class-
ed as in·stallments, assessments or otherwise 
' which may hereafter become due to appellant 
by respondent under respondent's stock sub-
scription contract with appellant. 
At no point during the tri1al of this case did 
respondent claim more than the right to require ap-
pellant to pay the $6,000.00 and any earnings there-
on over to the United States when the first install-
ment became ·due from appellant to the United 
States on the $11,400,000.00 contract (Tr. 4, 14, 
115, 16, 18, 71, 72, 75 and 76). Yet the trial court 
went much further and made the appellant an in-
vestor for the respondent, and conceivably liable 
for any loss resulting from a bad investment; 1and 
requires appellant to give respondent credit to 'the 
extent of the accumulated income on any assess-
ment, whethe·r it be one for operation and main-
tenance or some purely corpo11ation expense or other-
wise, whenever and in whatever amount thereof re-
s:pondent may see fit to ask for a credit. 'The Judg-
ment does not even permit appellant to pay the 
money over to the United States now and relieve 
itself of \the fiduciary duties imposed on it by the 
tri1al court. 
We are mindful that under Rule 54 (c), Utah 
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Rules of Civil Procedure the Judgment shall grant 
the relief to which the party in whose favor it is 
rendered is entitled even if the party has not de-
manded such relief in his pleadings. However, this 
rule does not permit an adju·dication of an issue 
which was never raised at the pleading stage or dur-
ing the trial of the case which the defendant was 
never called upon to meet. Taylor v. E. M. Royle 
Corporation, 1 Utah (2d) 17'5, 2164 P!ac. ('2·d) 2'79. 
In the instant case no issue was ever raised as to 
the right of respondent to receive a credit for the 
interest accumulations on any assessment except 
the one which will be levied by appellant to raise 
sufficient funds to pay the first installment to the 
United States on the $11,400,000.00 contract. Never 
did it claim the right to credit the interest !accum-
ulations on assessments levied for operation and 
maintenance or general corporate expense. It follows 
that the Judgment of the trial court in grantin~g re-
spondent relief beyond the pleadings and proof in 
this case must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The $6,000.00, when mlade, was a payment on 
the purchase price of the stock. The indebtedness 
of respondent to appellant was thereby reduced by 
$6,000.00. The parties so agreed in the formal writ-
ten Amendatory ·subscription Contract. As such the 
$6,000.00 became the property of appellant and as 
owner thereof appellant was entitled to any income 
derived from the investment thereof. 
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When respondent paid the $6,000.00 it got ex-
actly what it bargained for, i.e. a reduction in its 
inde'btedness to appellant by $6,000.00, as the Am-
endatory Subscription Contract expressly provides, 
and nothing more nor anything less. Respondent 
isn't out anything save and except a profit earned 
on appellant's investment. Nor ·has appellant gained 
anything a;t the expense of respon·den t. 
'T·he avowed purpose in respondent's paying the 
$6,000.00 to appellant was to avoid incurring M 
indebtedness in excess of respondent's statutory debt 
limitation. Any cla'imed agreement, the effect of 
which would not reduce respondent's indebtedness 
by the $6,000.00 paid, would be an illegal contract 
to violate the ·debt limitation statute. The claimed 
oral agreement enforced by the trial court has just 
that illegal effect. Furthermore, the effect thereof 
would nullify the election of the voters of respon-
dent District and would void the execution of the 
Amendatory Subscription Contract by exceeding the 
statutory debt limitation of respondent and the 
authority granted to the officers of respondent to 
execute the same. 
The rights, duties and obligations of the parties 
pertaining to the $6,000.00 were determined and 
fixed by the Amen·datory Subscription Contract as 
of February 3, 1947. The trial ·court erred in re-
ceiving ·evidence of conversations prior thereto as 
attempting to alter and imp~ach the applicable pro-
vision of the formal written contract. 
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There was no competent evidence offered to 
support the claimed oral agreement enforced by 
the trial court. All of the documentary evidence 
negatives any such agreement's having been m1ade. 
It hinges solely on one claim~ed conversation with 
one of the directors of appellant which, if had, is 
not binding on the corporation. 
The action taken by the directors~ of appellant 
corporation six weeks subsequent to the execution 
of the written contr~act has no legal effect. It does 
not make out an enforceable contract since it was 
a unilateral declaration for which no consideration 
passed. Nor was it a ratification of a prior un-
authorized act, since no intent to ratify is mani-
fested therein and in any event appellant corpora-
tion could not ratify an illegal contract. 
The Findin·gs Of Fact are not supported by 
competent evidence and the Conclusions Of Law and 
Judgment grants respondent relief beyond that ever 
claimed and beyond the pleadings and proof in this 
case. 
'V e respectfully submit that the record in this 
case compels setting aside the Findings Of Fact, 
Conclusions Of Law and the unequivocal reversal 
of the Judgment of the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOSEPH NOVAK 
520 Continenta:l Bank Building 
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